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Abstract
The harvesting of data about people, organizations, and things and their transformation into a form of capital is often
described as a process of “accumulation by dispossession,” a pervasive loss of rights buttressed by predatory practices
and legal violence. Yet this argument does not square well with the fact that enrollment into digital systems is often
experienced (and presented by companies) as a much more benign process: signing up for a “free” service, responding to
a “friend’s” invitation, or being encouraged to “share” content. In this paper, we focus on the centrality of gifting and
reciprocity to the business model and cultural imagination of digital capitalism. Relying on historical narratives and in-
depth interviews with the designers and critics of digital systems, we explain the cultural genesis of these “give-to-get”
relationships and analyze the socio-technical channels that structure them in practice. We suggest that the economic
relation that develops as a result of a digital gift offering not only masks the structural asymmetry between giver and
gifted but also permits the creation of the new commodity of personal data, obfuscates its true value, and naturalizes its
private appropriation. We call this unique regime “accumulation by gift.”
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Introduction
Primitive accumulation in the digital economy—the
appropriation of data about people, organizations,
and things and their transformation into a form of
capital—often takes place through what David
Harvey (2004) calls “dispossession,” or a pervasive
loss of rights buttressed by predatory practices.
(Jakobsson and Stiernstedt, 2010; Thatcher et al.,
2016; Zuboff, 2019) Violence—to social norms, social
relations, and the law—is an essential part of the pro-
cess—a feature epitomized by Facebook’s corporate
motto of “move fast and break things.” Strategies
mobilized to create new opportunities for profit include
the enclosure of the public commons, the disregard for
the legal rules that structure many industries, and the
commodification of people’s lives. Google’s massive
book digitization project is an example of the first.
Uber’s aggressive “disruption” of the taxi market illus-
trates the second. The transformation of persons into
bundles of commensurable (and valuable) units of
information epitomizes the third. Everywhere, the
basic approach involves launching “incursions into
undefended space,” pressing until “resistance is
encountered,” and then “[seducing, ignoring, over-
whelming, or simply exhausting] adversaries” (Zuboff,
2015: 140).
Yet, this picture is difficult to reconcile with the fact
that enticement and enrolment into digital systems
presents itself, and is often experienced as a much
more benign process. People sign up for a “free” ser-
vice, respond to a “friend’s” invitation, or are encour-
aged to “share” their views. If robbery is at stake, it is
taking place with a velvet glove, working primarily—or
so it seems—through sociality, reciprocity, and
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self-interest. Thus, the social logic of digital capitalism
often eschews the appearance of coercion.
Its economic logic seems distinctive, too. Many of
the components of this formidable economic
machine—from search to social media, from mail to
office tools, from games to self-tracking applica-
tions—came into our lives as handsome handouts
accessible, at no cost, to everyone. Gone is the time
when software was physical and expensive, or when
one could access these services only through subscrip-
tions. Crucial to the success of many web and cloud-
based services is that, like the web itself, they were
given away, at least initially. Billions of people and
millions of organizations happily signed up for compli-
mentary products promising universal knowledge, total
freedom, unbound creativity, amazing access, great
fun, or enhanced productivity.
Where, then, does profit come from? Strategies for
cross-subsidization in the digital economy come in var-
ious shapes and forms, but the most common, perhaps,
involves configuring people’s interactions with com-
puters so as to push the marginal cost of acquiring
information to zero. Companies’ seemingly disinterest-
ed favors to the world are, in fact, paid for by the sur-
veillance, tracking, commerce, and “heteromated”
labor (Ekbia and Nardi, 2017) of digital persons and
organizations, made profitable through targeted adver-
tising, predictive analytics, and the development of AI-
based systems (Anderson, 2009; Cockayne, 2016;
Fuchs, 2011; Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010; Zuboff,
2015). As Shoshana Zuboff puts it, “once we searched
Google, but now Google searches us. Once we thought
of digital services as free, but now surveillance capital-
ists think of us as free, or ‘free for the taking’” (cited in
Naughton, 2019).
In spite of the fact that pseudo-gifts are everywhere,
the significance of this particular economic form to the
accumulation process in digital capitalism remains
under-theorized, with a few notable exceptions. In his
Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy, Dave Elder-Vass
(2016) documents the wide range of economic forms
that populate the digital economy, from Wikipedia’s
“cooperative peer production” to Apple’s “monopoly
capitalism.” Restating Barbrook’s (1998) important
characterization of the “hi-tech gift economy” as a
place where the “money commodity and gift relations
[can] coexist in symbiosis,” Elder-Vass (2016: 176) dis-
cusses the hybridity of digital capitalism at every level,
for instance the role of “inducement gifts,” by which
digitally based companies seek to bring about
“subsequent exchanges in the market,” or the way
wage labor might be gifted in the form of open-
source software. Julia Velkova’s (2016) analysis of the
position of the Blender Institute in the field of digital
media describes the obligatory sharing of software,
tutorial, and open animation as a way for the organi-
zation to accrue power and reputation, to institution-
alize itself as an obligatory mediator of all creative
endeavors, and to generate financial sponsorship. She
reports that these practices also helped discipline the
labor force, including herself, into giving more and
more of their labor away for free.1
What is missing, perhaps, is a systematic account
of (and explanation for) the remarkable centrality of
gifting and reciprocity to the business model and cul-
tural imagination of digital capitalism. When we inter-
viewed Jake Ford,2 cofounder and CEO of EagleNet.
com, about the harvesting of personal data by digital-
ly based companies, he exclaimed (as if the answer
was completely obvious): “Hey dilbag, you’re getting
it for free! They have to make money somehow!”. We
could of course take Jake at his word that a bona fide,
fair, and voluntary economic exchange has taken
place, and there would be nothing else to say about
it. But why was it important to structure this
“exchange” in such a particular way, as a give-to-
get, in the first place? Why does the freebie play
such a crucial role in the business model of so many
digital companies? How does “data,” which fittingly
translates as “things given” in Latin,3 concretely
become the way the original favor must be repaid?
To answer these questions, we must understand
what it is that gifts, or pseudo-gifts, do. For anthro-
pologists, cycles of exchanges structured around gift-
ing and reciprocity can create economic and social
dependency just as surely as market exchange. In
the digital economy, gift-like relationships marked
by signs of liberality, a fuzzy temporality, and an
absence of commensuration have proliferated, argu-
ably fueling the rise of immense fortunes and accumu-
lations of power. How did this sharply asymmetric
form of reciprocity establish itself as a model for the
industry? What does the socio-technical infrastructure
that supports it look like? How does it continue to
sustain itself?
We find some answers to the first question in Marcel
Mauss’s (1990) classic essay, The Gift. Mauss’s emphasis
on the structural and ritualistic element in the gift offers
a promising insight into the social processes that under-
pin a wide range of economic relations in digital capi-
talism. Central to Mauss’s relevance here, particularly in
the interpretation given by Henaff (2010, 2013), is the
insistence that gift-giving is a form of alliance-making or
enrollment. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) extension of
Mauss’s framework helps us understand the fundamen-
tal misrecognition at play in gift-based, or quasi gift-
based, relationships—the strange combination of inter-
est and disinterestedness, which obfuscates the economic
nature of the exchange. Because the context we are ana-
lyzing is quite distant from the ceremonial gift-giving
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Mauss focuses on, however, we use a different term to
characterize the nature of the exchange at stake:
“bargain.” This more capacious concept allows us to
acknowledge that, while structurally framed as gift-like,
relationships in digital capitalism are more ambiguous in
the sense that (a) things given away are nonetheless
“traded” for something (even if it is something that
did not exist before the relationship was initiated); and
(b) this trade, from the point of view of the user, is often
misrecognized as no trade at all, or it may even be
brushed off as a steal, a “bargain.” By embedding the
obligation to repay into the original gift itself, we show,
the Maussian bargain not only masks the structural
asymmetry between giver and gifted but also permits
the creation of the new commodity of personal data,
obfuscates its true value, and naturalizes its private
appropriation.
Importantly, our analytical framework came about
inductively, as an unexpected byproduct of an ongoing
interview- and participant-observation-based empirical
project on the cyber-infrastructures of the personal
data economy, which we have been conducting in the
San Francisco Bay Area since April 2015. Below, we
present our theory of “accumulation by gift,” and its
historical origins in Silicon Valley culture and the
Internet. We then draw on our empirical data to flesh
out its technical features in today’s platform-centric
digital economy. In other words, we show how the
give-to-get works “in practice,” and why.
Markets from gifts
We are accustomed to thinking that what propels cap-
italism is the logic of capital, or rather, the designs of
capitalists: people with resources (money, land,
machines) at their disposal—whether earned or taken
by force—who seek to multiply it by financing old and
new production in anticipation of future valuations
and profits (Beckert, 2016; Deringer, 2018). Much of
economic science, including Marxist economic science,
rests on this view (Elder-Vass, 2016).
Yet we also know from anthropologists that the
roots of economic innovation and exchange are much
more ambiguous. Many economic relationships often
begin quite liberally, with acts of generosity—seeming-
ly free gifts that, according to demonstrated intentions,
need not be repaid. In his classic essay, Mauss (1990)
argues that gifts come first; reciprocity (and thus
exchange) second; calculation, money, and markets
develop out of the small and large imbalances created
by generous expenditures, not the other way around. A
gift, particularly the first gift in a reciprocity cycle, also
has a political function: it is a way to defuse possible
hostility, a “fundamental gesture or procedure of
public recognition between human groups [that]
establishes them as uniquely human and capable of
forming alliances and conventions, thus constituting
the very genesis of the political relationship” (Henaff,
2013: 15). That is why refusing gifts is often
“tantamount to declaring war” (Mauss, 1990: 13).
There is ample ethnographic evidence that many
economic transactions and markets do, in fact, origi-
nate “from gifts” (Velthuis, 2018). Elder-Vass (2016:
176–177) reminds us that freebies have a long history
in marketing (for instance, free recipe books to famil-
iarize consumers with Jell-O in the early 20th century
or free songs to generate interest in an album).
Similarly, feelings of intimacy and obligation, generat-
ed through gifts, play an essential role in the accom-
plishment of a market for human eggs (Almeling,
2011), in the sale of life insurance in China (Chan,
2012), and in the circulation of organs, cadavers, and
cadaver parts, which depends on a constant stream of
donations (Anteby, 2010; Healy, 2006). More general-
ly, salespeople are known to rely on reciprocal social
obligations to elicit a sense of interest and loyalty
among potential buyers and help them move through
the stages of the sales process, all the way up to the
closing of the deal (Darr and Pinch, 2013). Mears
(2015) found in her research on “bottle girls” in the
VIP service industry that the entire business relies on
these women’s sense of reciprocal obligation to their
brokers, who shower them with gifts and perks. She
suggests that not making explicit the true value of
these favors facilitates the extraction of potentially
greater value from the girls themselves.
“Information wants to be free”4
The digital economy, too, is replete with the language
and practice of liberality, and with a fundamental
ambiguity about the values being exchanged (or
rather, given and repaid). The concept of a gift econo-
my features prominently in many early accounts of the
electronic frontier and online communities (e.g.,
Barbrook, 1998; Kollock, 1999; Rheingold, 1993).
The information technology sector of Silicon Valley
arose in part out of the anti-hierarchical, socialist affin-
ities of the 1960’s Bay-Area counterculture and anar-
chist hacker ethics of the 1980’s free software
movement (Levy, 1984; Turner, 2006).5 These
demanded that code be freely shared with the commu-
nity of developers, without proprietary restrictions.
This norm was institutionalized through the forceful
socialization of successive generations of “newbies”
(Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001). The gift culture
was, for instance, well established among members of
the Whole Earth Lectronic Link, helping support a
sense of community (Turner, 2006, 157; also see
Rheingold, 1993).
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In the metaphor usually attributed to Richard
Stallman, code should be “free as in free speech,” it
should circulate so people can use, tinker with, and
improve upon it. Like their counterparts in what
Mauss called “archaic societies,” the gifts of the
cyber-culturalists were offered not to individuals but
to the collectivity, and they contained a similar political
promise: virtual processes would ignore private prop-
erty, bridge social differences, foster creativity, and
build community (Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001;
Frosio, 2015).
Often software—and cyber products more general-
ly—were free in another way, however: they were
shared at no cost, free as in “free beer.”6 But even
those inventors of code who made no money from it
benefited from their munificent actions in other ways,
often with lucrative implications. As Fred Turner
(2006) writes: “Because they are explicitly removed
from systems of market exchange, gifts can come
back to participants not as money, but as reputation,
artistic pleasure or friendship or all three” (80). What
gifts generate, first and foremost, is recognition and
therefore symbolic benefits (Henaff, 2010; Velkova,
2016). (The exaggerated gift exchanges that sustain
the Burning Man festival are perhaps the most striking
illustration of this culture (Turner, 2009).) Kollock
(1999) argues that sharing public goods online fosters
a feeling of increased efficacy, group attachment, and
expectations of reciprocity (whether specific or gener-
alized).7 Indeed, one of our interviewees, an AI entre-
preneur, who started his career in the hacker
community, captured the ethic of generalized reciproc-
ity well: “I have always shared everything, I never
expected anything. And I have always gotten it back;
I have gotten back way more, in fact” (Ramsey
Gordon, December 2018).
As venture capital poured into the American tech-
nology sector during the 1980s and 1990s, investors
had to reckon with this culture and with the progres-
sive–libertarian politics that went along with it. The
free software movement pioneered new legal standards
to prevent software from being appropriated (the GNU
general public license, for example), while allowing a
commercial market for services to develop. In 1991, the
Finish programmer Linus Torvalds released a kernel
for the GNU operating system, Linux, which would
later fuel a rapid growth of practical applications, nota-
bly for web servers and mobile. The idea that “money
commodity and gift relations [can] coexist in
symbiosis” (Barbrook, 1998) became more commonly
accepted, and the more business-friendly term of “open
source” was adopted in lieu of “free software.” Today,
even mainstream companies—including Microsoft,
Facebook, and Google—rely on such distributed devel-
opment of code. Open source has moved from “the
counterculture” to “the establishment” (Finley,
2019), with business scholars hailing “open
innovation” strategies—or the capture of sources of
knowledge and innovation from organizations and
developer communities that exist outside the bound-
aries of the firm—as a new pathway to profitability
and success (Chesbrough, 2003).
With the emergence of social media and web appli-
cations that live and evolve on the Web, what was orig-
inally a dyadic relationship between companies and
developers turned into a triad. Now users were includ-
ed into the gift, too, a strategy not only for capturing
the user-led innovations and product improvements
described by Von Hippel (2005) and others, but also
for generating new forms of value, like user-generated
content (e.g., “likes,” ratings, social media posts),
cross-site or cross-app tracking, and social networks,
which enable content-creation, profiling, and the
growth of mass user bases, respectively (Bechmann
and Lomborg, 2013: 771–774). For example, many of
Google’s signature projects—from Search to Chrome,
Maps to Earth, Mail to Drive, Translate to Books—
were introduced as free gifts to whomever cared to try.
We must not downplay the political effects of these
generous “opening gifts,” the immediate enrollment
of allies through commitment, and the public recogni-
tion that ensues (Henaff, 2013).
The attachments generated by digital gifts have a
different materiality than those that stem from the gift-
ing of physical goods, which necessitates sequential
(and temporally spaced) acts of volition. By contrast,
those who accepted the digital gifts found themselves
enrolled in a relationship that continued on its own,
every time they touched the algorithm. As users were
enlisted in the production of the gifted object, the bond
became more intimate—both metaphorically and liter-
ally. This was the beginning of the Web 2.0, which took
advantage of people’s active engagement with digital
products and sought to capitalize on it (just like devel-
opers before were encouraged to build on top of open-
source code). It brought with it the recognition that
these products, and in particular the algorithms that
govern them, do not exist outside of the “practices
that people use to engage with them” (Seaver, 2017: 4).
What Zuboff (2019) calls the “behavioral surplus”—
the data produced by people using, working on, and
working with algorithms and “sharing” (or being made
to “share”) their labor, expertise, desires, opinions, or
emotions through the infrastructures of the platform—
allowed for the development of a lucrative advertising
market that finally made the fortune of many previous-
ly unprofitable digital businesses. The gift could now be
reframed as a valuable market strategy that everyone
should follow. By and large, it was: “one entrepreneur
after another [chose] to give their service away, even
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though it could have been provided behind a pay wall”
(Gruen, 2017). More gifts, finally, meant more econom-
ic returns.
The Maussian bargain
Accordingly, many 21st century tech companies began
describing the process of data-generation as a volun-
tary, bilateral exchange (of code against code, or code
against data). This framing was, for instance, implicit
in the increasingly complex legalese that pervaded
“terms of service” forms. The idea of a contractual
agreement between the platform and the user (or devel-
oper) may make legal and commercial sense, but it is an
enormously impoverished view of the nature of their
relationship. What we call the Maussian bargain
broadens the picture, to encompass the whole economic
(but also socio-technical) relation that develops as a
result of a digital gift offering. The term aims to
acknowledge that users (or developers) are incorporat-
ed into something that transcends them and over which
they have little control.
In today’s gift-saturated digital capitalism, refusing
digital freebies takes tremendous effort and exposes
one to not only miss out on the enjoyment created by
participation, but also to social marginalization. In
many ways, the relation is obligatory, sustained by
the larger social community whose existence is itself
largely digital, too. In particular, platform-based com-
panies structure reciprocity in such a way that it
appears to be directed at the collectivity of users
rather than themselves: people “share” their news
with their “friends” and acquaintances, rather than
with Facebook; they expose their professional informa-
tion for potential LinkedIn connections to peruse,
rather than for LinkedIn itself; and their photos are
directed at other Instagrammers, rather than
Instagram. Social media firms organize themselves as
social collectives: you cannot belong without offering
yourself to a community of users, often ceremoniously
and without the expectation of immediate reward.8
Gifting is generally a public, sometimes spectacular,
act (Mauss, 1990). Users themselves are encouraged
to engage in lateral gift exchanges (by accepting each
other’s requests, commenting on each other, tagging,
sending virtual gifts, etc.) with each other so as to prog-
ress in the network, amass more and more connections,
and attain a higher social status within its ecology. In
practice, people will over-extend themselves to be
included in the (vertical or lateral) gifts, if only
because—as Mauss suggests—they are a condition of
their own (and new) social existence. To the extent that
“society” has largely moved online, one is socio-
technically obligated to “share” just to be part of it.
“Shareability,” or the crafting of social bonds through
digital gifts (links, tweets, tags) is, fundamentally, a
“performance of the self” (Papacharissi, 2012), as argu-
ably all gifts are (Henaff, 2013). But it is double-edged:
while it generates inclusion and group belonging, it also
subordinates by vicariously enrolling the targets of
these performances into the platform, subjecting them
to new community norms and obligating them to rec-
iprocity in the form of returned favors (Jarrett, 2015).
Much of this is not monetized.9 As in the Maussian
gift, the absence of explicit calculation is an economic
strength for the original giver. Because the infrastruc-
ture is itself constantly evolving, no perfect calibration
of the exchange is possible on either side. So terms of
service and privacy notices are, in this sense, always
misleading, in addition to being often vague and
ambiguous (Gluck et al., 2016). As Pierre Bourdieu
(1977) observed, one of the fundamental features of
any gift is the fact that it is “misrecognized” (171). It
is “a game in which everyone knows—and does not
want to know—that everyone knows—and does not
want to know—the true nature of the exchange”
(Bourdieu, 2000: 191–192). And it is precisely that
very open-endedness, the gift’s lack of finality and mea-
surement, that maintains the relationship over time.
Reflecting on the expectations of “sharing” her work
that the Blender Institute placed on her in exchange for
her access to the studio, Velkova (2016) writes: “It is
impossible to say when a debt is repaid. No matter how
many texts I have put online on my blog, it was hard to
say when that would be sufficient.”
There are good economic reasons for the centrality
of gifts and gift-like bargains to capitalism: as Velthuis
(2018), following Beckert (2009), argues, these kinds of
exchanges help solve three crucial “market-ordering”
problems: competition, coordination, and valuation.
As we show below, this is especially true of digital cap-
italism. First, start-up companies typically have little
cash to spare. Most of their resources consist in con-
nections to users, and gifts generate attachments and
habits that help stabilize the market environment, solv-
ing the problem of competition. (In fact, a key role of
“free” is to avoid regulatory scrutiny: without a price, it
is hard to document standard antitrust logics of any
sort.) Second, to the extent that many digital compa-
nies are market intermediaries between users and sellers
(i.e., platforms), each side of the multi-sided market
can be offered as a freebie, or as collateral, to the
other side, jumpstarting the reciprocity cycle through
a quid pro quo. This gift-based infrastructure literally
creates the missing commodity, the thing to be
exchanged, solving the problem of coordination
(Velthuis, 2018). Third, this coordination is non-
monetary: since users do not appreciate the value of
what they are putting out there, and companies do
not explicitly price what they are seeking to acquire,
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reciprocity (in the form of data sharing, for instance)
helps circumvent both the technical difficulties of valu-
ation and their possible legal complications, such as
price-fixing. Fourth and most importantly, the gift-
like structure allows for a constant ratcheting up of
exchange, solving what we might call here the problem
of institutionalization. As pointed out above, non-
monetary “sharing” maintains enough opacity about
the nature of the exchange at stake that reciprocal
demands will, in effect, lock users into a perpetually
renewed transactional cycle in which consent is
assumed “forever” (Custers, 2016). This is in contrast
with “spot” market social relationships, which have a
finite horizon and dissolve once the transaction has
been completed (Graeber, 2001: 151–228).
Finally, the Maussian bargain is not some academic,
conceptual abstraction. It is an actual, practical
achievement. First, as we discussed, digital gifts are
rooted in the specific history and cultural trajectory
of cyber-capitalism. Lavish handouts by digital firms
must be understood in the context of the particular
sociality of the hacker community, the historical–insti-
tutional configuration of financial and human capital
that enabled the rise of such firms, and, increasingly,
the displays of power by new actors searching for rec-
ognition. Second, we have suggested that—at least on a
theoretical level—digital offerings are not anti-
economic or even a-economic (as framed by Romele
and Severo, 2016). In fact, they permit the materializa-
tion of personal data as an asset (Beauvisage and
Mellet 2020), a thing that exists and can be circulated,
while simultaneously obfuscating its true value and
naturalizing the process of private appropriation as a
form of obligatory reciprocity. In that sense, digital
pseudo-gifts have become instruments to generate the
primitive accumulation of data. But what does this pro-
cess look like in practice? The next sections are devoted
to an empirical exploration of the material, legal, and
social infrastructures that support the culture of liber-
ality, openness, and (especially) open-endedness in dig-
ital capitalism—ultimately allowing the Maussian
bargain to do its economic work.
Research design
We rely on qualitative evidence obtained from various
sources. First, we conducted in-depth interviews of 23
respondents, mainly technology company founders,
employees and former employees, privacy experts,
and technical researchers who work in the personal
data ecosystem. This includes companies that collect
and sell data they have sourced, organizations that
buy and clean data, providers of “data brokerage”
and “data fusion” services, applicable regulatory agen-
cies, researchers, and consumer-rights advocates.
All of our respondents work, or have worked, in the
Bay Area of California. As the historical home, and
modern hub, of the technology industry, this site was
strategic. We recruited respondents via email and
phone. We used snowball sampling techniques, with
leads generated from our professional contacts in
industry and academia and gathered from interview
respondents. Interviews averaged 1 hour 40minutes.
We audio-recorded interviews with participants’ writ-
ten informed consent and transcribed them. Coding the
interview transcripts according to categories of themes,
we relied on a combination of inductive reasoning,
which allowed for emergent issues and topics, and
deductive reasoning, which was informed by our
prior research and participant–observation fieldwork.
Our respondents represent a diverse range of back-
grounds, expertise, and subfields across the personal
data ecosystem, including technical, commercial,
legal, consumer advocacy, journalistic, and academic
concentrations. Respondents’ primary occupations
broke down as follows: five data scientists/privacy
researchers, four founders of data-centered technology
companies, one online marketing specialist, three pri-
vacy professionals (two working for large, multi-
national organizations and one working for a data
services firm), two academics, two software engineers,
two technology journalists, two practicing attorneys
(one regulator, one technology civil rights advocate),
one actuarial consultant, and one entrepreneur-
physician working at the intersection of health and
technology.
Second, we conducted over 55 hours of participant–
observation research at 13 industry and research/aca-
demic events from April 2015 to February 2018.
Commercial technology industry events included four
professional conferences (21 hours) and two presenta-
tions (2 hours). The research/academic events included
one two-day conference (16.5 hours) and five research
talks/presentations (15.75 hours). These events were
publicly advertised and open for public registration
and attendance. With the exception of one presentation
at an east-coast university attended via phone, all
events took place in the Bay Area. This observational
research allowed us to better understand the technolo-
gies, business models, products, and governance issues
involved in this space and observe participants in
action.
Third, using the Wayback machine of the Internet
Archive, we systematically reviewed the changing terms
of the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for
Facebook and MySpace, going back to these compa-
nies’ founding. As we show below, our interview mate-
rial revealed the relevance of these APIs to
understanding the socio-technical infrastructure of the
Maussian bargain. Finally, we supplemented this
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information with publicly available sources about data
sharing agreements, such as the British Parliament
inquiry into Facebook in the wake of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal (Collins, 2018).
Engineering reciprocal obligations
We have suggested that the centrality of digital give-
aways in cyber-capitalism evolved from within the early
hacker ethic, which emphasized the free (and often
gratis) circulation and fixing of code. Nissenbaum
(2004) argues that these kinds of strategies were, in
fact, critical to attract the community of skilled laborers
who came of age within that culture and upon which
Internet and software companies critically depended.
But while the hackers celebrated it, the cyber-gift (for
example, in the form of open-source licensing) did not
seem to hold much promise as a business strategy.
Venture capitalists were not convinced and neither was
the media, at least early on (Moore, 2001).
Fast forward three decades, and digital firms see
cyber-gifts as a key to the primitive accumulation pro-
cess—a crucial means by which to extract valuable troves
of personal or organizational data. What follows is an
effort to give an account of the various forms of obliga-
tory reciprocity that cyber-gifts generate and firms benefit
from: sharing data as a right of entry into a community,
as a formof organic solidarity between users and firms, as
generalized reciprocity, and as social ritual.
Free materials: Inciting to share
Where the hacker culture framed its ideology around
principles of free circulation and democratic control,
corporations in this sector came to understand their
business model through the metaphors and practices
of “openness” (Chesbrough, 2003) and, later, “sharing”
(Karger, 2017). The words have a pleasant and fuzzy
connotation. Openness conjures images of freedom,
transparency, unchartered spaces. Sharing evokes not
only a relationship of mutual advantage, but also the
pleasures of community, a “communism of the senses”
(Graeber, 2014: 69). In fact, users are often incited to
think of their contribution as an act of selflessness, a
voluntary donation that will benefit a noble cause, for
instance medical research in the case of shared genetic
material (Harris et al., 2013; VanDijck and Poell, 2016).
Of course, what happens in practice is that most of
the gains accrue to the intermediary (or platform), which
enables the valuable exploitation of this collective
wealth. Jake Ford, founder of a business intelligence
platform, explained his vision in the following way:
The big picture is that our goal at EagleNet is to have tens
of millions of business professionals using the EagleNet
platform for free, or some form of free, providing the
data. And then we go and then sell that data and those
insights to enterprise customers. That’s our business
model. (Interview with Jake Ford, November 2017)
Max Buck, co-founder of the start-up ContactInfo, had
a similar way of describing his company’s philosophy:
ContactInfo is basically a free, crowd-sourced [individ-
ual] database. So the way that it works is that it’s a
completely free product. And users sign up in order to
get free [contact information] from our database. (. . .)
Essentially, it’s a give-to-get model. In order to get
[others’ contact information] from our database, you
need to anonymously share your [information] with us.
(Interview with Max Buck, October 2016)
Both of these entrepreneurs emphasize the gift-like lan-
guage of the “free” and open service. For both, how-
ever, accepting the gift comes with an obligation of
reciprocity on the part of users—the obligation to
“share,” to “give” in order to “get.” Users’ collective
involvement in this reciprocity cycle is key to generate a
return both to them and the community as a whole.
Importantly, the logic is not bilateral but holistic.
Without a large number of people giving their infor-
mation away to the community, it (and the firm that
“represents” it) has no future. In fact, the community
does not exist without the software that processes this
obligation. The promise of new social bonds is what
jumpstarts the reciprocity cycle.
Social media platforms are particularly skilled at
performing the cultural work necessary to actualize
these obligations and normalize the practice of expo-
sure in the process. With machine-learning driven per-
sonalization, apps that promise to unlock the mysteries
of the self to itself are in a position to demand much
more data “sharing”—contacts, photographs, loca-
tions, likes, etc. The re-interpretation of one’s life by
way of an anonymous algorithm elicits the affirmative
pleasures of both self-crafting and of being looked at
(Sartre, 1956: 234–236). The first achievement of the
digital economy, then, is to have institutionalized
what Finn (2017) calls a “mirrored glass pavilion”
and Harcourt (2015) an “expository society,” a
“space where we exhibit ourselves and become the
voyeur to others” (114; also see Fourcade, 2017).
Free labor: Growing the intelligence
The second form of the reciprocal, obligatory, gift-like
relationship—free labor—is related to but distinct from
the gift of free materials. Companies dealing in data,
whether collecting, labeling, cleaning, etc., often enlist
users in the process on the grounds that doing so will
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provide access to, or otherwise improve, the product or
service being provided. Users in that sense do not simply
share materials; they perform a labor. Terranova
(2000)—who critiqued both traditional Marxist
accounts of the late 1990s Internet-based digital econo-
my as capitalist appropriation of cultural production as
well as overly optimistic depictions of a flattened, liber-
ated knowledge economy—was early to recognize the
value of the “free labor” provided by Internet users to
web-centric technology companies. This was exemplified
by activities like participation in mailing lists, chat
rooms, and open-source software communities. In
today’s era of behavioral targeting, predictive analytics,
and massive ad networks, simply by trafficking and nav-
igating “free” digital platforms, services, and websites,
Internet users are akin to “produsers” (Bruns, 2008) or
“prosumers.” The latter, a term originally coined by
Toffler (1980), has been updated for today’s Internet
media era to refer to a hybrid species of consumer-
producers whose consumption of a service or product
also entails producing content that companies and plat-
forms exploit to capture attention and affective value or
to repurpose toward new uses (Cockayne, 2016; Fuchs,
2011; Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010).
As Sam Kumar, an engineer, explained: “Industry’s
first shot at these things is not automation but just
massive manpower” (Interview with Sam Kumar,
July 2017). Another entrepreneur respondent, Bill
Hall, founded a company that operates as both a
mobile app that provides information about a particu-
lar type of food/beverage product after a user uploads
a photo of it, as well as a sort of broker between the
user-consumer and local retailers.10 In doing so, he
emphasized the importance of capturing users’ taste
preferences and purchase intent above all else. As if
to underscore that point, he described how the compa-
ny focuses the user on-boarding process around the
labor needed to get at those preferences and intent:
We’re trying to classify people as they come in. So
when you sign up, you don’t even have to actually
create an account. But we’ll ask you a few questions
about the styles of [the product] that you’re interested
in. (Interview with Bill Hall, September 2015)
The reciprocal obligation of free and disinterested
labor is ubiquitous in the digital economy: providing
content (as in Wikipedia), commenting, rating, etc. all
of which often (not always) serve to power the devel-
opment of advertising services, predictive analytics,
and, increasingly, artificial intelligence systems. Tag
your own photos, and Apple makes giant steps in
facial recognition. Correct the translation, or identify
objects in the CAPTCHAs, and you help Google devel-
op automated translation or improve computer-vision
systems. Indeed, for many of our respondents the ideal
business model looks like Emile Durkheim’s “organic
solidarity,” but on steroids—everyone, including users,
doing their part to fix the machine, making it ever more
precise and efficient. This is a process that Ekbia and
Nardi (2017) have called “heteromation.”11
Many of these activities tread a fine line between
freedom and obligation. Coercion, however, becomes
most obvious when the free labor that powers the dig-
ital economy bleeds into sites of traditional labor.
People applying for a position, for instance, may find
it impossible to refuse to be video-recorded during the
employment interview. That recording will not only
serve to develop new algorithmic products, but it will
be processed and categorized in such a way that the
interviewee might feel the repercussions for their
entire career. Similarly, workers simply doing their
job (e.g., answering customers’ inquiries) may soon
realize that they create the data (e.g., conversations)
that feed the AI, which may, one day, replace them.
The workplace also sometimes becomes the site of
collecting valuable supplementary data on employees.
As interview respondent Tim Brown, a data scientist
himself, discussed with regard to a former employer:
All the employees [at my prior company] got issued a
Jawbone fitness tracker to wear. That was just, ‘Oh, it’s
free, whatever.’ But it’s all rolled up into their systems.
I mean it was all collected by—you can see where this is
going, right? . . . It was publicly shown which teams
were doing worse and which were doing better.
(Interview with Tim Brown, March 2016)
Employee data may be deployed, as here, to evaluate
job performance or motivate workers. Employers and
third-party vendors use such data for a host of other
applications, including to optimize tasks or predict the
likelihood of employees quitting their position. Finally,
the data may be transmitted or sold to third parties
(like insurance companies or data brokers), following
people in other realms of their lives.
Generalized reciprocity: Data sharing agreements
We now turn to the gift-like economic practices that
power what economists call “network effects” (Rochet
and Tirole, 2003). Platform-based companies, in par-
ticular, cater to two audiences simultaneously: end-
users and third-party content providers (primarily
application developers in our case). To appeal to
users, the platform must be attractive. This often
results in companies offering discounted or even free
access to the price-sensitive market side (Parker and
Van Alstyne, 2005). In the case of services like
Google search and Facebook’s social network, this
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side of the market is the end-user. But to further attract
users, companies also rely on developers to produce
additional functionalities layered into the platform—
typically, third-party applications, many of them free
to users and built through the company’s APIs (“open”
APIs, often free to use, but with proprietary source
code, see Qiu, 2017). Developers, in turn, increasingly
commit to the platform as the number of users
increases; more users mean more opportunity to
obtain something of value from the collaboration.
In practice, since source code is really off-limits
(Galloway, 2004), users themselves are often the
return gift that the company offers for developing for
the platform, a gift made under the polite term of “data
sharing agreement.” Indeed, for everyone involved,
“the users are the product.” Our respondents repeated
this phrase, popularized by technology critic Bruce
Schneier but with origins as a critique against the dom-
inance of 1970s-era broadcast television companies
(Oremus, 2018), on numerous occasions. What this
means is that users (or various slices of them) are the
gift that gets passed along to other users, to developers,
and to the platform itself. The circuit (in Figure 1)
includes both direct (1) and indirect forms of reciproc-
ity, where the original giver (the platform/app) gifts
third parties (developers) (2), who then gift users (3)
whose data then funnels back both to the developer
and to the platform/app (and sometimes to the manu-
facturer of the device as well). The whole circuit defines
what anthropologists call a form of “generalized
exchange” (see Bearman, 1997; Levi-Strauss, 1969).
The Cambridge Analytica scandal is an almost-
textbook example of the (potentially harmful) symbio-
sis between platform, developers, and users: a simple
personality test application, installed by about 270,000
people on Facebook, gave its developer access to not
only users’ profile data but also their friends’. Through
network effects, the data harvested covered as many as
87 million Facebook users (Barrett, 2018). These, in
turn, were sold and repurposed for political marketing.
David Chadwick, a software engineer, described a sim-
ilar process in the case of another early Facebook app:
[There was one application called] SuperPoke!. It was
very popular; I think it was the number one on
Facebook at that time. It was just a small application
that let you send different types of pokes to your
friends, so something very lightweight. This application
asked you for lots of information about your friends.
Then the Facebook API let this application, when you
were using it, get access to all your friends’ graphs and
a lot of data, about you, your friends, your profile and
all that . . . . A lot of companies were creating these
applications that were free, just as little games, or
little things that were not monetized. But they got a
lot of valuable data from users . . . . These APIs,
I think Facebook created them in 2007, and so any-
body in the tech industry who had been playing with
these APIs knew that it was very easy to just pool lots
of data about users and keep them in your own data-
base and then do something else with them. (Interview
with David Chadwick, April 2018)
Indeed, the terms of service on Facebook’s developers’
platform, which we have reviewed systematically from
the date of the company’s founding, were quite loose at
the beginning, when Facebook desperately needed suc-
cessful developers to boost the appeal of its service. In
2007, Facebook gave third-party apps, like Super Poke
described above, access to its network. This enabled
developers to gain insights into the connections and
“likes” of Facebook users. A few years later, in 2010,
Facebook announced its “Open Graph,” which
enabled external website owners, among other things,
to incorporate auto-login capabilities without using
“Facebook Connect” and add Facebook plug-ins
directly on their website (e.g., a Facebook “Like”
button). These features allowed Facebook to perform
cross-site tracking of users on the web and allowed
websites to gain access to a Facebook user’s “public”
interests (via their “likes” on Facebook) and friends
network when the user visited the website (O’Mara,
2019; Schonfeld, 2010).
In 2011, the Federal Trade Commission filed a com-
plaint against Facebook, with most counts having to
do with Facebook’s sharing of personal user data with
third parties and misrepresentation of its privacy
policy. In an email to top Facebook executives from
19 November 2012, made public through a 2018 UK
Parliament investigation report, Mark Zuckerberg,
CEO of Facebook later explained:
We’re trying to enable people to share everything they
want, and to do it on Facebook. Sometimes the best
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Figure 1. Generalized reciprocity in the digital economy.
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developer build a special purpose app or network for
that type of content and to make that app social by
having Facebook plug into it. However, that may be
good for the world but it’s not good for us unless
people also share back to Facebook and that content
increases the value of our network. So ultimately, I
think the purpose of the platform—even the read
side—is to increase sharing back into Facebook.
(Collins, 2018: Exhibit 48)
Although Facebook discussed the possibility of selling
access to user data to app developers, it ultimately decid-
ed against it (Farivar, 2018). But the very openness of
the API was an economic move all the same, designed to
help Facebook achieve “the right balance between ubiq-
uity, reciprocity and profit,” as Zuckerberg himself ulti-
mately concluded in his November 2012 email (Collins,
2018: Exhibit 48). It gave Facebook control over what
developers could and could not do (see Qiu, 2017), and it
helped secure a relationship with this valuable labor
pool through the lure of monetization (via third-party
advertisements, in-app purchases, opportunities for
additional data collection), access to venture capital,
and sharing into the loftier ideals served by the business
(e.g., making technology more democratic, creating
vibrant communities through the multiplication of
social ties). Most importantly, it turned reciprocity
between Facebook and its developers into a graph-
growing and data-producing engine for the company.12
The social structure of trust and consent
Because gifts are supposed to be made freely, and at a
sacrifice (in time or money) for the giver, and because
they take the form of a peaceful extension of social
bonds, the parties will avoid casting suspicion on the
intentions that animate them. The default presumption
is the giver’s goodwill. “TheFacebook” was once a
Harvard-specific service seemingly designed to foster
group solidarity. It leveraged Harvard students’
trust in their own social world and borrowed from
the well-institutionalized genre of the picture book.
Mark Zuckerberg seems to have discovered the eco-
nomic and political potential of this informal social
contract almost accidentally, as the following exchange
with a friend, cited in Vargas (2010), shows:
Zuck: yea so if you ever need info about anyone at
harvard
Zuck: just ask
Zuck: i have over 4000 emails, pictures, addresses, sns
Friend: what!? how’d you manage that one?
Zuck: people just submitted it
Zuck: i don’t know why
Zuck: they “trust me”
Zuck: dumb f(**)ks
In other words, Zuckerberg capitalized on actual (off-
line), rather than virtual, sociality within a tightly knit,
elite social group. As the company grew beyond the
Harvard tribe, strategies of enrollment (and thus the
primitive accumulation of data) continued to empha-
size trustworthiness. Unlike its main competitor,
MySpace, Facebook used real names. Again as a way
to differentiate itself, it offered copious verbal reassur-
ances about keeping personal information safe and
treating it with respect. Finally, its social origins, at
what was arguably the most prestigious university in
America, may have been the most credible sign that it
was an honorable, genuine endeavor. As it turned out,
Facebook abandoned many of these strategies, crucial
to its success as an upstart social media platform, once
it marginalized its competition (Srinivasan, 2019). The
violations of the original promise that followed caused
an enormous public outrage, understandable only in
light of the implicit and explicit social contract upon
which the company had built its triumphant rise.
Companies knowingly exploit the power of social
bonds in generating interest and confidence in their
products. For example, many digital gifts make their
way into the world in “beta” form, wherein only those
“in the know” lead users can partake (Von Hippel,
2005). Beta testing comes by way of a select invitation
to try the service, which the receiver is unlikely to refuse
because she has been designated as deserving of this
special trust. Likewise, she feels a natural compulsion
to reciprocate by commenting honestly or even helping
improve the product, motivated by the existing solida-
ristic bond with the giver (which has just been reaf-
firmed), the special feeling of being at the forefront
and sometimes the promise of real deals.
Social connections are essential to enroll the not-so-
special, too, both through network effects and through
the normative, institutionalized character of social life.
Because personal information is so deeply entangled
with the identity of the giver (and not simply in the
metaphorical sense of the “spirit of the thing given,”
as in the Maussian gift), the default assumption is that
it deserves, and thus receives, special care. A wealth of
empirical evidence shows that people are unlikely to
actively question demonstrations of sincerity by
others. This is primarily due to the necessity to main-
tain a belief in the reality of the social world (Goffman,
1959). But in situations of power imbalance, such as the
ones explored here, it is also born out of resignation,
inability to change the terms of the exchange, or lack of
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understanding (see, e.g., Barocas and Nissenbaum,
2014; Custers, 2016; Peacock, 2014; Turow et al., 2015).
Meanwhile, digital firms use a variety of psycholog-
ical, emotional, and economic incentives, disincentives,
and heuristics to repeatedly nudge users and customers
to “share” ever more information (Acquisti et al., 2015;
Fourcade, 2017; Yeung, 2017). Thaler and Sunstein
(2008) use the term “choice architecture” to refer to
these techniques. These include the manipulation of
default settings to encourage social rituals favorable
to disclosure (McKenzie et al., 2006)13 or the exploita-
tion of what psychologists call the “zero-cost” cogni-
tive bias (Shampanier et al., 2007), which to us is
nothing but the psychological translation of the social
relevance of moral understanding and obligation (what
Emile Durkheim calls “the non-contractual element” in
the social contract).
Companies are well aware of the social and psycho-
logical nature of consent and reciprocity. As interview-
ee David Chadwick remarked: “basically, people at
[these companies] have read all these books by the
behavioral psychologists or economists, and I’d say
these companies are a great test lab for testing on
users” (April 2018). In his 2003 book, widely known
in the industry (along with his training seminars and
classes), Stanford psychologist B.J. Fogg relies on a con-
ception of “computers as social actors” to define a new
science of “captology.” He describes the interactive
strategies that computing technologists should use to
foster trustworthiness and persuasion, so as to “support
an intensive, positive relationship (many interactions or
interactions over a long time period) between the user
and the product” (Fogg, 2003: 194). Social metaphors
are everywhere: “Designers should design interactions
that will weather well, like a long-standing, comfortable
friendship” (194). Elsewhere, Fogg (2003) writes:
“People don’t adopt mobile devices; they marry them”
(192). Computers “create relationships” (critics would
say addiction) by “rewarding” users with positive feed-
back, offering models or targets for their behavior, and
providing social support (Fogg, 2003).
Broad, catch-all terms of service that reach beyond
their avowed commercial purposes allow companies to
capitalize on these socio-technical bonds in both
expected and unexpected ways. One of our interviewees
was especially candid about the significant economic
possibilities afforded by the indeterminacy at the
heart of the Maussian bargain, saying: “Our Terms
of Service is broad enough that we can scrape anything
in the signatures [of emails]. We’re storing that, but we
don’t know how to utilize it yet. There are ideas . . .”
Later, he elaborated:
One of our investors . . . [who has] been very involved in
data companies and stuff . . . says, actually, the most
valuable data is people’s purchase history. Where, you
know, I can see a company literally mining inboxes for
Amazon purchase history because that’s extremely,
extremely valuable. And so . . . I mean, if I’m being
blatantly honest, our Terms of Service is broad
enough that we can do that if we want to. But the
issue is that . . . these sorts of things . . . the cat is
going to get out of the bag that, you know. . . . So
while you can do it secretly, and you can do that for
forever, that’s fine. But eventually someone is going to
find out[.] And then it would be uncomfortable, and
then there’s fallout from that. (Interview with Max
Buck, 2016)
This kind of self-regulation is very precarious, however:
the institutional mechanism that supports the
Maussian bargain is only an invisible social contract
that the company will act in good faith and not
betray or abuse its users’ trust. But solidarity with
users is only as good as the value proposition that
comes with it.
Conclusion: From gift to market?
As Velthuis (2018) points out, gift-like practices can act
as “catalysts of market emergence,” and they have also
been crucial to generating profits and order in the dig-
ital economy. We have also emphasized the extent to
which this particular type of reciprocal obligation—the
Maussian bargain—is enabled by various features
of systems-engineering and design: vast amounts of
“shared” data, often supplied by the free labor of
users themselves, feedback loops that open systems to
the action of their users, APIs designed to create net-
work effects, and the manipulation of online rituals
and affordances via the “choice architecture” to
achieve the desired kind of indeterminacy and implicit
obligation. It is through these features that the
Maussian gift has evolved into a bargain: instead of
the solidaristic “moral economy” that sustains the
former, we have ended up with the “economic moral-
ity” of the latter (Fourcade 2017), a set of moral rela-
tions deliberately planned to constantly replenish the
data pipeline at the cheapest cost.
Ironically, it is today the market—not the current
gift-based system—that is appearing in various pro-
gressive projects as a possible political solution to the
extractive relationships enabled by the Maussian bar-
gain. Such projects aim to compensate individuals for
the personal data that they provide (Arrieta-Ibarra
et al., 2018; Elvy, 2017; Posner and Weyl, 2018), or
for the real labor supporting the product (Bacevic
and Muellerleile, 2018; Lanier, 2013). Ironically, this
proposed liberation from free services often relies
upon users being enrolled into new systems of payment
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(a movement now joined by none other than
Facebook!), thereby generating yet another collection
of commodities: tokens and digital currencies. New
“self-sovereign” apps and companies are proliferating,
“promising empowerment and cryptospoils” from this
straightforward market relation—though delivering
none of it in practice so far (Barber, 2018). The mes-
sage, however, is appealing. Facebook and the like are
gifts we are not sure we still want. But we are at pain to
know, whether practically or emotionally, how to dis-
entangle ourselves from the obligations they have cre-
ated for us.
Now that the gift has enabled the constitution of
personal data as valuable things to be exchanged and
circulated, the market is hungry to take over and com-
plete what Karl Polanyi (2001) called the
“subsumption” of persons and social relations to eco-
nomic motives. Or rather—and this may be the ulti-
mate “conversion narrative” (Block and Somers,
2005)—we have been made hungry to sell this data.
In other words, like Polanyi’s (2001) workers, who
were made to starve so they could think of themselves
as repositories of a labor force that had to be sold so it
could feed itself, we have been made to feel cheated of
our data and think of ourselves as valuable data repos-
itories who need to sell ourselves (bit by bit) so that we
can just be. Thirty years from now, who will remember
the time when the market did not reach so deep inside
of us? Chances are we will view this market, like all
others, as natural, and we will forget that our personal
data was once truly “things given.”
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Notes
1. The relevance of “free labor” to the creation of value is
also well established in the post-Marxist literature (e.g.,
Fuchs, 2011; Huws, 2014; Terranova, 2000).
2. In order to protect confidentiality, all names of interview
respondents and their affiliated companies or organiza-
tions used in this paper are pseudonyms. Readers should
infer no connection to actual names of respondents, their
organizations, or any other actual person or
organization.
3. In Latin, the term “data” means “things given” or
“gifts.” The first clear English-language definition, in
1587, defines datum as “A thing given, a gift delivered
or sent” (Furner, 2016).
4. Steven Levy (2014) attributes this phrase to Stewart
Brand. The full quote is:
On the one hand information wants to be expensive,
because it’s so valuable. The right information in the
right place just changes your life. On the other hand,
information wants to be free, because the cost of get-
ting it out is getting lower and lower all the time. So
you have these two fighting against each other.
5. The other critical ingredient, often obfuscated by trium-
phalist narratives about inspired entrepreneurship, was
much more institutional: large portions of the IT sector
were dependent on government (and specifically Defense
department) grants, another kind of “gift,” as well as
enabling policies like the Small Business Investment
Act of 1958 (Mazzucato, 2015; O’Mara, 2006).
Stanford University provided a decentralized system for
distributing federal grants, a critical hub of highly skilled
human capital and research facilities, and vast real estate
holdings for firms to develop (O’Mara, 2019; Saxenian,
12 Big Data & Society
1994). Venture capital, particularly the geographically
concentrated venture capital of Silicon Valley (Zook,
2002), started flooding the sector only after government
investments had helped launch a wave of successful inno-
vations. In other words, digital capitalism’s ability to gift
depended on already-accumulated capital (i.e., from
grants and from VC).
6. A well-known quote on the GNU website states:
“Free software” means software that respects users’
freedom and community. Roughly, it means that the
users have the freedom to run, copy, distribute, study,
change and improve the software. Thus, “free software”
is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the
concept, you should think of “free” as in “free speech,”
not as in “free beer”. We sometimes call it “libre
software,” borrowing the French or Spanish word for
“free” as in freedom, to show we do not mean the soft-
ware is gratis. (Emphasis in original, https://www.gnu.
org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html)
7. Generalized reciprocity is akin to generalized exchange in
social exchange theory, and it applies when the gift-giver
does not know the recipient(s) of their contributions,
which is often the case online (Bearman, 1997; Kollock,
1999; Levi-Strauss, 1969).
8. We thank anonymous Reviewer 1 for pushing us on this
point.
9. There are exceptions, however. On Reddit, the US-based
content-sharing site, users can pay their own money for a
Reddit Premium membership, which allows them to gift
“Reddit Coins” to other users who post submissions or
comments, in turn gifting those users with their own coins
or other membership benefits. A similar process plays out in
the largely unregulated Chinese live-streaming scene on the
platform YY, for instance (Thompson, 2015).
10. We offer a general description of Hall’s company to pro-
tect identity.
11. The dynamics we describe, especially in this section, are
limited to industrialized economies and (primarily) US-
based technology firms. But such firms also draw from,
and often exploit, the labor of people in the Global South
(e.g., hardware and consumer electronics produced there,
the data tagging and content moderation often performed
by underpaid workers) (e.g., Gray and Suri, 2019). We
credit anonymous Reviewer 3 for emphasizing this.
12. In their privacy policy from 2009 onwards, Facebook
reserved the right to gather cookies from third-party
applications and advertisements, including information
on the actions users took while interacting with the appli-
cation or advertisement.
13. Stutzman et al. (2013: 21–25) found that, between their
2009 and 2010 observation periods, the percentage of
Facebook profiles that publicly revealed information
such as high school, hometown, address, interests, favor-
ite movies, etc. doubled, reversing a prior trend of limit-
ing disclosure. But instead of reflecting a change in users’
willingness to share this information, this change
coincided with Facebook changing its default visibility
settings for those same fields to publicly available, indi-
cating the power of default settings in affecting
disclosure.
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